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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MICHAEL BENJAMIN, ARTHUR 0. 
LLOYD, EDWARD DAVIS, FOR-
REST H .GREENE, and WELDON 
NOLLKAMPER, Plaintiffs, Case No. 7330 
vs. 
BERT LIETZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is a suit instituted in the District Court for Salt 
Lake County by Michael Benjamin, Arthur 0. Lloyd, Edward 
Davis, Forrest H. Greene and Weldon Nollkamper, seeking 
to enjoin the defendant Bert Lietz from operating the Sugar-
house Planing Mill. The trial court granted an injunction 
• and defendant appeals. 
I 
STATEMENT OF PLEADINGS 
The original Complaint alleges generally the operation 
of the planing mill; that since 1943 the defendant has operated 
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the mill after 6:00 p. m., and on Sundays. That it caused 
loud and unusual noises; that in September of 1947, defendant 
"installed a woodworking machine on the outside of his build-
ing," which he operated between 6:00 p. m., and 10:30 p. m., 
which he had not made a practice of doing prior to 1943. 
That the plaintiffs were in lawful possession· o£ property in 
the immediate locality of the mill and that the noises made 
by the mill were "so loud as to make normal conversation in 
the homes of the plaintiffs difficult and interferes with their 
peace, quiet and enjoyment of their respective homes," and 
that it interfered with their normal sleep;. (Tr. 1-4). 
I 
Defendant answers denying that the noises were loud or 
unusual or that it made any noises except such as result from 
use of power saws and planing machinery necessary for the 
operation of the plant and affirmatively alleges that he installed 
the machinery under the direction of public officials. That 
the plant was established forty-four years ago by defendant's 
predecessors-in-interest; that the land in the immediate vicinity 
was vacant property, far removed from residential sections 
of Salt Lake City, and while in operation, the plaintiffs and 
their predecessors-in-interest erected dwelling houses near the 
planing mill. That as wood working machines wore out and 
became obsolete and demands for the products of the mill 
changed, it became necessary to remove machinery, install 
improved equipment, and during excessive demands for the 
products of the mill, to operate the same for long hours, and 
at times, continuously. Denies that the capacity of the mill 
has been materially increased or the hours extended since 
194~. (Tr. 6-9). 
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Shortly before the case was called for trial, the plaintiff 
filed an amendment to the complaint setting up. the ordinance 
of September 6, 1927, hereinafter quoted, and added the fol-
lowing paragraph: 
"That the defendant's planing mill and plaintiffs' 
property adjacent thereto are located within the com-
mercial district of Salt Lake City and have been since 
the enactment of such ordinance on September 1, 192i 
That the defendant's plant since September 1, 1927, 
has been enlarged beyond capacity of 50 horse power 
in violation of the above alleged zoning ordinance, and 
the defendants have made installations of additional 
machinery and such alterations and additions of 
machinery have not been confined to the building lo-
cated upon the premises at the time the zoning. ordi-
nances were passed, all in violation of said zoning 
ordinances, and such violation continues to this date, 
and the defendant threatens to continue such violation 
indefinitely in the future." (Tr. 32). 
An answer to the amendment was filed denying that installa-
tions or additions to the mill were in violation of the zoning 
ordinance. (Tr. 35) . 
II 
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE 
The Sugar house Planing Mill was built by defendant's 
father about 1900 at 2032 South lOth East Street, in Salt Lake 
City, and operated by him until 1928. Defendant has operated 
it since 1928. (Tr. 57, 107 and 166). 
Benjamin's wife inherited property at 2028 South lOth 
East Street and the Benjamins have lived there since 1934. 
Mrs. Benjamin is a sister of defendant. The Benjamin resi-
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dence .is about 20 or 25 feet due north of the -mill. (Tr. 75, 
76 .. and 107). 
Plaintiffiloyd has resided at 2021 South lOth East Street 
(rear) for about three years. His residence is across the 
street from the planing mill. (Tr. 98). 
Plaintiff Greene has resided at 1997 Lincoln Street, about 
150 yards Northwest of the planing mill, for about eight years. 
(Tr. 69 and ·70). 
·Th~ Merrill Appliance Company, Inc., is located at 967 
~ast Twenty-First South Street about 100 feet from the planing 
mill. (Tr. 131 and 132-). 
During the years 1900 to 1944 the operationsof the plan-
. ing mill· were enclosed in one building situated near the street. 
This building was about 45 or 50 feet long; East and West. 
(Tr. 76). In February of 1944 under War Production Board 
and City Building Permit a· new cinder block building, about 
30·feet North and South and 62 feet East and West, was erected 
West of the old building. (Tr. 58). In 1947 or 1948 (Tr. 
61 and 86, a concrete slab was layed on the· South and West 
of the cinder block building extending therefrom 9 feet on 
the South and 16 feet on the West. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). 
The old building contained various machi~es used in 
the; planing mill business. From time to time these machines 
were replaced by· new machines because of obsolescence, effi-
ciency, wearing. out, etc. Some of the new machinery so in-
stalled was noiser, and some not as noisy, as the replaced 
machinery. (Tr. 146-149). The total aggregate horse-power 
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of the motors in the old building from prior to 1927 has been 
125 horse-power. (Tr. 105-106). 
In the new building is installed the following machinery: 
5 horse-power hand pointer 
2 horse-power bench cut off saw 
50 horse-power re-saw 
5 horse-power tenoner 
1¥2 horse-power moulding machine 
10 horse-power rip saw 
On the cement slab is located the following machinery: 
Dust collector 
30 horse-power planer 
30 horse-power moulder 
10 horse-power blower 
the total aggregate power of the motors in the new building 
and on the cement slab is 149¥2 horse-power. (Tr. 117 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit A) . 
The hand-pointer, bench cut off saw and moulding 
machine above referred to were old machines moved from the 
old building to the new building. All of the other machines 
were replacement items for machines discarded with the excep-
tion of the re-saw, dust collector, moulder and blower. The 
last four machines did not replace other machinery. (Tr. 
150, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). The 
blower was installed under the direction of the Salt Lake· City 
fire marshal as a safety measure. (Tr. 143 and 144). The 
re-saw was installed on order of War Production Board. (Tr. 
150). All changes in the plant, increases in horse-power and 
installation of additional machinery requiring permits from 
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Salt Lake City have been authorized by such permits. · Tr. 
144 and 145). 
At all times since September 6, 1927 there has been m 
effect in Salt Lake· City the following ordinances which plain-
tiffs pleaded: 
"Sec. 6720. Commercial District. 
(a) All buildings and premises may be used for any 
purpose permitted in Residential "A," "B," "B-2" and 
"B-3" districts and Business "A" district and also for 
any trade, industry or use except the following, which 
are hereby prohibited, subject to provisions of Section 
6728 of this chapter and of paragraph (b) hereunder. 
46. Planing mill or woodworkings plant using in 
excess of 50 horsepower." 
"Sec. 6720B: Stables, lumber yards, fuel yards, dyeing 
and cleaning establishments, public garage, mortuary, 
wholesale milk distributing stations, sheet metal works, 
machine shops, laundries, mattress factories, lumber 
mills, planing mills, or food products manufacture 
shall not be permitted in Commercial districts within 
one hundred feet of a dwelling or apartment house." 
"Sec. 6728. Nonconforming use. 
Any use of buildings or premises at the time of the 
passage of the. Zoning Ordinance· on September 1, 
1927, may be continued, although such use does not 
conform to the provisions hereof. In the· case of a 
building such use may be extended throughout the 
building, provided that no structural alterations are 
made therein, except those required by law or ordi-
nance. Providing no structural alterations are made, 
a nonconforming use may be changed to any use per-
mitted in a district where such nonconforming use 
would be permitted. Any nonconforming use changed 
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to a more restricted use or to a conforming use shall 
not thereafter be changed back to a less restricted use. 
No non-conforming building which has been damaged 
by fire, explosion, act of God or act of the public 
enemy, to the extent of more than sixty ( 60) per cent 
of its assessed value, shall be restored except in con-
formity with the regulations of this ordinance. 
Any nonconforming use building, existing in any 
residential district at the time of the passage of the 
Zoning Ordinance, September 1, 1927, may be re-
constructed or replaced to conform with all require-
ments for a Residential "B-3'' district, including all 
required yard spaces." (Tr. 31, 32, 35 and 168). 
The Utah Power & Light Company furnishes power for 
the Sugarhouse Planing Mill. According to its accounts the 
Demand Kilowatt (kilowatt demand rating on a 15-minute 
basis each month) for every month in the year 1947 was 
less than 35. (Tr. 123). In 1948 some months were above 
35 and some months were below. (Tr. 123 and Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit B) . The average Demand KW of the months in 
1948 was 36.6. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B). A kilowatt is equal 
to 1000 watts and 745.7 watts is equal to one horse-power. 
35 kilowatts equals approximately 50 horse-power. (Tr. 121 
and 122). 
Defendant's father, prior to 1927, and defendant, since, 
with a crew of several men, worked in the planing mill at 
night. (Tr. 119). Plaintiffs testified that until 1943 the 
operations of the planing mill were quietly conducted and 
did not bother them. (Tr. 70, 71, 77 and 78). In 1942 and 
m 1943 defendant made boxes for the government resulting 
in loud noises caused by men hammering nails and boards. 
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Men .were employed at night to carry on this work. (Tr. 70, 
.71, 79 and 82). In the latter part of 1943 the noise was in-
creased by the filing and the use of band saws. (Tr. 79 and 
80). Benjamin described it as a very piercing noise. (Tr. 80). 
The plaintiffs testified the noise could be heard in the Benjamin 
house with the doors and windows closed. However, the 
noise did not bother the occupants of the Merrill Appliance 
Company, Inc. situated next South of the planing mill. (Tr. 
131 and 132). Plaintiffs complained of the planer in the fall 
of 1947 or spring of 1948. (Tr. 73). Pliiintiffs' chief com-
plaint was of the noise occurring on week-day nights. (Tr. 
90, 91, 100, 104 and 112). Plaintiffs did not complain of 
noise occurring on Sunday, except for the operation of the 
blower. (Tr. 113). 
III 
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS 
Upon the pleadings and evidence as hereinabove abstract-
ed, the court made findings of fact to the effect that in 1943, 
the defendant commenced running the machinery after 6:00 
P.M. and on Sundays, and that he employed from five to 
thirty men. That the· defendant operated the mill until 10: 30 
or 11:00 practically every night. (Tr. 39-40). 
That toward the end of the year of 1944 defendant 
erected a cinder block building about 30 x . 60 feet and a 
cement "apron" along the side of his building. That he con-
structed "a huge blower and dust collector," located on the 
10 
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outside of the building. That the planer, blower and dust 
collecter "make loud, unusual and penetrating noises which 
can be heard distinctly in the homes of all of the plaintiffs; 
that said noises are so loud as to disturb the plaintiffs ip. their 
enjoyment of their premises," all of which had never before 
existed. (Tr. 40). 
That 
"Since 1943 the defendant has increased the installed 
horsepower capacity of his said plant; that during the 
entire year of 1947 the defendant used more than fifty 
horsepower of electricity each month and said plant 
has a rated horsepower capacity in excess of fifty 
horsepower. That during most of 1948, including 
the time when the defendant was under a restraining 
order issued by the above entitled court, the defendant 
used more than fifty horsepower of electricity in said 
plant." (Tr. 40). 
all of which increased the noise emanating from the said mill. 
That the defendant's employees caused loud and unusual 
noises, and in addition to the operation of the planing mill, 
that the defendant made noises in the manufacture of wooden 
boxes. (Tr. 41). 
That the operation of the outside machinery including 
the blower and dust collector caused dust and shavings to 
blow about the neighborhood which did not result before 
the installation of the outcide machinery. That the defendant 
prior to 1943 did not operate the machinery after 6:00p.m. The 
court finds that the plaintiffs occupy their property as residents 
and that the noise interferes with the enjoyment of the prop-
erty. (Tr. 41). 
11 
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That the ordinances hereinbefore set out were enacted 
on September 6, 1927, and that the defendant's planing mill 
is. :within the. commercial district of Salt Lake City, and ''that 
_the defendant's plant since September 1, 1947, has been en-
larged beyond the capacity of 50 horse-power in violation 
of the above zoning ordinance." (Tr. 42- and 43). 
The court draws the following conclusions: 
1. That defendant should be enjoined from operating 
his plant "after 6:00 p. m. on any day" and "for any purpose 
on any Sunday." (Tr. 44). 
2. That defendant should be enjoined from utilizing at 
any time more than fifty horsepower of electrical energy. 
(Tr. 44). 
3. That defendant should be enjoined from operating 
any outside machinery. ( T r. 44) . 
4. "That the defendant should be permitted to go to his 
shop himself at any time of day or at any time during the 
night, but he should be enjoined from engaging in any type 
of work on his premises after 6: 00 p. m. at night and until 
7: 30 the following morning and all day on Sundays if such 
work will create any noise which will disturb the peace and 
quiet of the neighbor~ood, or which can be heard by the plain-
~iffs if! their homes."_ (Tr. 44). 
:: 1 5. "That no employees other th~n the defendant should 
be placed in said building except for nightwatchman or the 
doing ·of work which will cause no noise between the hours 
of 6:00 p. m. at night and the following morning at 7:30 
12 
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a. m., and all day on Sunday, and the defendant should be 
enj?ined from operating his plant at all and from starting 
said machinery for any purpose or from operating his saw 
filer or his machines to any extent whatsoever, either for the 
working of machinery or for the setting of said machine for 
the doing of work the following day between the hours of 
6:00 p. m. and 7:00 a. m. of the following morning and all 
day on Sunday." (Tr. 44). 
The decree specifically enjoins the defendant from operat-
ing or permiting ·the operation of his machinery between 6: 00 · 
p. m. and 7:00 a. m., and all day on Sunday, from causing 
to be used at any time more than fifty horse power of elec-
trical energy or any type or kind of energy, from operating 
any type of p<;>wer driven machinery on the outside of the 
building and specifically a 30-inch planer, the blower and 
dust collector and all machinery located on the concrete apron 
and finally the court finds the defendant guilty of contempt. 
(Tr. 46 and 47). 
IV 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
ING A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS 
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT GRANTING THE 
PLAINTIFFS ANY RELIEF WHATSOEVER FOR THE 
REASON THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE 
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF AC-
TION. 
13 
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2. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
OF FACT NO.4 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE INCRE~SE 
IN CONSUMPTION OF HORSE-POWER SUBSTANTIAL-
LY INCREASED THE NOISE EMANATING FROM THE 
PLANING MILL FOR THE REASON THAT THERE IS 
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH 
FINDING. (Tr. 40 and 41). 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
OF FACT NO.7 TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD NEVER OPERATED THE PLANING MILL AFTER 
6:00P.M. PRIOR TO 1943, FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT SUCH FINDING AND 
IS CONTRARY THERETO. (Tr. 41 and 42). 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
OF FACT NO. 12 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT'S PLANING MILL HAS BEEN ENLARGED BE-
YOND THE CAPACITY OF 50 HORSE-POWER, IN 
VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE NO. 6720, FOR THE 
REASON THAT SAID ORDINANCE DOES NOT APPLY 
TO DEFENDANT'S PLANING MILL:. (Tr. 43). 
5. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLU-
SION OF LAW NO.1 TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFEND-
ANT SHOULD BE ENJOINIED FROM OPERATING HIS 
PLANT AT ANY TIME AFTER 6:00P.M. ON ANY DAY 
AND AT ANY TIME ON SUNDAY FOR THE REASON 
THAT ·suCH CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO THE 
LAW·. (Tr. 44). 
14 
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6. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLU-
SION OF LAW NO.2 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DE-
FENDANT SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM UTILIZING 
AT ANY TIME MORE THAN 50 HORSE-POWER OF 
ELECTRICAL ENERGY IN HIS MILL FOR THE REASON 
THAT SUCH CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
(Tr. 44). 
7. THE COURT ERRED IN DRAWING CONCLU-
SION OF LAW NO.4 AS FOLLOWS, TO-WIT: "THAT 
THE DEFENDANT ... · SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM 
ENGAGING IN ANY TYPE OF WORK . . . AFTER 
6:00P.M. AT NIGHT AND UNTIL .7:30 THE FOLLOW-
ING MORNING AND ALL DAY ON SUNDAYS IF 
SUCH WORK WILL CREATE ANY NOISE WHICH WILL 
DISTURB THE PEACE AND QUIET OF THE NEIGHBOR-
HOOD, OR WHICH CAN- BE HEARD BY THE PLAIN-
Til"FS IN THEIR HOMES," FOR THE REASON THAT 
SUCH IS WITHOUT AUT~ORITY OF LAW. (Tr. 44). 
8. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECREE 
ENJOINING THE DEFENDANT FROM .OPERATlNG 
HIS PLANING MILL AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO 7:30 
A.M., AND AFTER 6:00P.M. ON ANY DAY AND AT 
ANY TIME ON SUNDAYS FOR THE REASON THAT 
IT IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW. (Tr. 46). 
9. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECREE 
ENJOINING DEFENDANT FROM USING OR CAUSING 
TO BE USED AT ANY TIME MORE THAN 50 HORSE-
15 
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;FOWER OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY FOR THE REASON 
THAT SUCH IS CONTRARY TO LAW. (Tr. 46). 
10. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-
, ', ' 
ING JUDGMENT ENJOINING THE DEFENDANT FROM 
OPERATING POWER MACHINERY LOCATED OUT-
SIDE OF THE BUILDING AND PARTICULARLY: FROM 
OPERATING A PLANER AND A BLOWER FOR THE 
REASON THAT THE SAID BLOWER WAS INSTALLED 
UNDER THE ORDINANCE AND DIRECTIONS OF SALT 
LAKE CITY. (Tr. 46 and 47). 
11. THE COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING AND DE-
CREEING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT 
OF COURT FOR THE REASON THAT HE WAS NOT 
TRIED FOR CONTEMPT. (Tr. 47). 
v 
POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT 
(a) THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE FACTS 
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The defendant is in trouble with the law because he likes 
to work. His father before him liked to work. They liked 
to work in their own mill in their own way and do their work 
~hen called for. For nearly half a century, the father and 
t~c:;11 the son owned and operated a planing mill at 2032 South 
lOth. East Street, beginning when it was in harmony with the 
time to work and when there was no one in the . immediate 
16 
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neighborhood ·who wanted to sleep while the defendant and 
his father wanted to work. Times have changed. Work by 
the defendant, at least in his own shop, on his own time, and 
in his own way must cease at 6:00 in the evening and must not 
begin before 7: 30 in the morning, and work of any character 
must not be done on Sunday. At least, that is what the court 
has said in this case. Baseball may go on. Sleepers are not 
molested by the assembling of noisy crowds at the games. 
Garages may do their work day or night and Sundays. Pool 
halls, etc., apparently are not banned: but the sawing and 
planing of lumber, which is music to the ears of this defend-
ant, is. outlawed. · 
Authority for the violent restnctlon and limitation on 
the right to work, imposed by this judgment must be found 
m the law if this judgment is sustained. 
We, therefore, turn to the pleadings in this case for the 
purpose of finding, if we can, an allegation of fact upon which 
to base such restrictions upon the use of property as are im-
posed by the court. The original complaint does not justify or 
support the decree entered. 
It is alleged the defendant in the war years, worked day 
and night making boxes for the Army. During the time 
th~ demands of war existed, no one complained of day and 
night work. The government wanted the boxes, and the 
defendant made them. The allegations, therefore, respecting 
that work, are in no sense a justification for the entry of a 
decree enjoining the defendant from beginning work before 
7:30 in the morning or continuing it after 6:00 in the even-
17 
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ing. The time of beginning and ending work, as so fixed, 
is entirely arbitrary. There is nothing in the pleading what-
soever justifying that arbitrary time. There is nothing in the 
pleading and nothing in the law which in any sense justifies 
an injunction forbidding the defendant from entering his own 
place of business during those hours and taking with him 
men necessary to do the work.. The extent to which the court 
went in restricting the defendant is emphasized by conclusion 
No. 4 that defendant should be enjoined from engaging in 
any type of work on his premises "after 6:00 p. m. at night 
and until 7: 30 the following morning and all day on Sundays 
if· such work will create any noise which will disturb the peace 
and quiet of the neighborhood, or which can be heard by the 
plaintiffs in their homes." That is the spirit of the findings 
and judgment and would form the basis of a contempt pro-
ceeding were the defendant to give way to his feeling and work 
when he felt he ought to work. One may search the rather 
prolix complaint in vain for anything that even suggests a 
restriction. 
Even though the pleading contained allegations to the 
effect that it was the desire of the plaintiffs to be shielded 
fromnoises of that kind from 6:00p.m. to 7:30 the following 
morning, it would have no support in the law. Possibly, aside 
from statutes and aside from ordinances, noises would justify 
interposition of a court, still nothing is made to appear by this 
pleading to justify such a judgment. A planing mill means 
lumber will be sawed· and planed. Necessarily, that means 
noise, but unless machinery is running smoothly and unneces-
sary vibration eliminated, the planing mill is not efficient and 
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must necessarily fail. Something out of the ordinary must b.e 
alleged and proved to justify such restrictions and the restric-
tions must be reasonable. 
Terrell-vs. Wright, 87 Ark. 213, 1125 S.W. 211. 
After reviewing many cases, it is stated iri Note II of 
the Annotation, Bartel vs. Ridgefield Lumber Company re-
ported in 37 ALR 683, at page 690, paragraph 1, the following: 
"The right absolutely to enjoin the operation of f. 
saw or planing mill in a manner constituting it a 
nuisance has been recognized, but the injunctions ac-
tually issued as to such mills generally have been of a 
restricted character. Courts interfere by injunction 
against such establishments with great cau~ion, and 
only in cases where the facts are weighty and important, 
and the· injury complained of is of a serious and per-
manent· character.'' 
(b) PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DECREE ENJOIN-
ING THE DEFENDANT FROM "STARTING THE 
MACHINERY LOCATED THEREIN AT ANY 
TIME ON SUNDAY" IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY 
UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE STATE. 
Broadbent vs. Gibson, 140 P 2d 939. 
or under the ordinances of Salt Lake City. 
Gronlund vs. Salt Lake City, 194 P 2d 464. 
The Decree is arbitrary and unreasonable. 
(c) THE ORDINANCE PLEADED STATES NO 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
The pleader evidently assumed that a mill with a poten-
tiaJ horse-power, in excess of fifty, was unlawful. The ordi-
nance justifies no such inference. A mill existing on Septem-
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ber 1, 1927, could be continued in harmony with the ordinance 
in the manner in which it existed at the time the ordinance was 
adopted.. This mill had a power plant in excess of SO 
horse power at that time. As to what horse-power was being 
used is not made to appear. Machines wore out, became ob. 
solete and were ·replaced with other machines. Complaint 
was made as to shavings and dust, and at the instance of the 
city, a dust collector was installed and the receptacle for the 
dust was placed outside of the building. In fact, the old 
building, like machinery, became unsuitable for use, and a 
cinder. block room was added in the rear. Nothing, however, 
was done except under the direction and supervision of the 
city. There is added to the amendment to the Complaint, a 
paragraph no doubt intended to bring the defendant under 
and subject to the ordinance. The pleader says: 
"That the defendant's plant since September 1, 1927, 
has been enlarged beyond the capacity of SO horse 
power in violation of the above alleged zoning ordi-
nance." (Tr. 32). 
No facts were pleaded. The fair interpretation of this sen-
tence is that any power plant, in excess of 50 horse-power, is 
violative of the ordinance. 
Further, 
.. and the defendants have made installations 
of additional machinery and such alterations and addi~ 
tions of machinery have not been confined ·to the 
building located upon the premises at the time the 
zoning ordinances were passed, all in violation of 
said zoning ordinances." (Tr. 32). 
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That again does not bring the defendant under the ordinance 
to the extent that the decree limiting the available power at 
the plant is in violation of the ordinance. Furthermore, the 
ordinance reads: 
"planing mill or woodworkings plant using in excess 
of 50 horsepower." (Tr. 31). . 
The potential available horse-power is not the criterion. It 
it the use of the horse-power only which would bring the 
defendant within the_ ordinance. In 1948, apparently the de-
fendant used about 1 Y2 horse: power more than 50 horse-power 
at one time. The record is not clear as to whether that con-
tinued for any appreciable length of time. But, there is still 
lacking any evidence to the effect that the defendant did not . 
use in excess of 50 horse-power prior to September 1, 1927. 
He had it available for use, and there is no pretense on the 
part of the plaintiffs that the defendant did not use in excess 
of 50 horse-power in this plant prior to the date of .the ordi-
nance. 
Clearly the. burden was upon the plaintiffs to allege and 
prove the horse-power used by defendants prior to September 
1, 1927, and the horse-power used subsequent thereto. There 
was neither pleading nor proof of the former essential fact. 
The potential horse-power prior to September 1, 1927, as dis-
closed by the power of the various machines, was 12 5. The 
. potential horse-power at the time of the trial was 150. The 
actual horse-power used before September 1, 1927, is not made 
.to appear, and the maximum used horse-power since that time, 
as above observed, is slightly in excess of 50. The plaintiffs' 
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case was therefore incomplete as prediCated upon the ordi-
nance and even though it appeared that the defendant had 
in fact used 1 Y2 horse-power in excess of 50 or the power used 
before 1927, the limitation of the injunction of the court 
should be as to the excess power only. It would have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the hours of work, much less justify 
the practical closing of the shop except during the specified 
hours. 
(d) CONCLUSION NO. 4 IS ERRONEOUS AND 
PREJUDICIAL FOR IT PUTS IT WITHIN THE 
POWER OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO SAY WHETH-
ER THE DEFENDANT MAY OR MAY NOT DO 
WORK IN HIS SHOP DURING THE FORBIDDEN 
TIME FOR IT IS FOR THEM TO SAY WHETHER 
THEY CAN HEAR A NOISE. 
Whether that kind of conclusion would mean that the 
noise must be loud enough for all of the plaintiffs to hear a 
noise at the same time, or whether the defendant would be 
in contempt of court if noise is heard by one· of the plaintiffs 
only is not clear. The mere statement indicates the ridiculous 
basis for determining whether the defendant is in contempt 
of court. The conclusion is equally ridiculous insofar as it 
applies to Sunday work. There is no statute or ordinance in 
any respect justifying this conclusion. 
The decree itself is without support in the pleadings, in 
the evidence, in the findings, or in the law. Specifically the 
limitation of hours from 7:30a.m. to 6:00 p. m. is arbitrary, 
unreasonable and without authority of law. 
There is no law or evidence justifying the injunction bar-
ring Sunday work. 
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The ordinance does not justify a limitation to 50 horse-
power. 
The blower was installed at the instance of the city and 
hence its use is not subject to injunction under' the· ordinance. 
(e) THE FINDING OF DEFENDANT GUILTY 
OF CONTEMPT WAS WITHOUT HEARING. AND 
PREJUDICIAL. 
After the CO!Jlplaint was filed pending the trial of the 
case, it was stipulated that the defendant would not operate the 
planing mill between 7:00 p. m. and 7:00 a. m. and on Sun-
days between 7:00p.m. and 9:00a.m. (Tr. 15). 
On July 31, 1948, an order was issued requiring the de-
fendant to appear and show cause why he should not be 
punished for c~ntempt. (Tr. 23). There was no hearing 
upon the order. to show cause at any time, notwithstanding 
which the court found him guilty of contempt. It is true no 
punishment ·was imposed but it was a warning that punishment 
would be imposed if the defendant made a noise which "could 
be heard by the plaintiffs in their homes." 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment is erro-
neous, far beyond any support in the pleadings in the evidence 
or in the findings of fact and that the judgment should be 
reversed with directions to dismiss the case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, BAYLE & RUSSELL, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant. 
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